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These two new little books by the Italian logician N. Grana provide us with new
insights into some technical and philosophical aspects of paraconsistent logics, esp. of logics
belonging to the «Brazilian» current initiated by N. da Costa. Both booklets are very well
written, very clear, quite accessible to the layman and yet full of interesting content which
emerges as truly novel to most logicians, let alone to such as don’t devote their time to
searching into logical subjects.
The former booklet goes into the semantics of da Costa’s calculi C, which constitute
the first important kind of paraconsistent copulative sentential logics to have been proposed.
(Paraconsistent logic in general drop the Cornubia rule, namely: p, not-p q. Copulative
logics are such as have the adjunction rule, namely: p, q p∧q.) The outstanding character-
istic of the C calculi — as against, e.g., some relevant paraconsistent systems, such as
Sylvan’s, or transitive logic, which is a tensorial infinite-valued nonArchimedean system
— lies in both rejecting the law of noncontradiction and yet possessing a strong negation
defined as the thus negated formula’s entailing some higher order contradiction. (The two
other mentioned trends do instead contain the principle of noncontradiction and either lack
any strong negation (relevant logics) or else introduce strong negation through a quite
different procedure, by means of a primitive over-assertive functor read as ‘[it is] wholly
[the case that]’.) Within da Costa’s [meta]logical framework contradiction orders are
characterized recursively: «p∧¬p» is of first order; «(p∧¬p)∧¬(p∧¬p)» is of second order,
etc. The limit of those calculi is system Cω with no strong negation. As semantics is con-
cerned, the most useful, natural modelisation proposed for those systems is one wherein
[simple] negation is not truth-functional: if v(p)=0, then v(¬p)=1, but when v(p)=1, the
value of «p» may be either 0 or 1. Such is the kind of non-truth-functional 2-valued
valuations, which N. Grana studies carefully in his booklet.
The author also goes into applications of da Costa’s valuations method to other
logical systems such as proving decidibility or reaching new decision procedures as regards
intuitionistic logic, several deontic and temporal logics, finite-valued logics and some
relevant logics. This little book contains useful information on those results. Its only defect
is that it is too sketchy on higher level issues and developments and silent on how da
Costa’s calculi relate to other paraconsistent systems. The bibliography ought to have been
enlarged with some omitted reviews.
The latter booklet goes into the relationship between logical systems which either
lack noncontradiction or contain negations of [instances of] that principle and systems which
do the same as regards the principle of excluded middle (the latter being the paracomplete
logics, such as, most prominently, Heyting’s intuitionistic logic.) It also puts forward some
considerations linking the use of certain non-alethic systems (systems both paraconsistent
and paracomplete) to a broad range of issues, such as: some views in physics and philos-
ophy of science (Schrödinger, H. Weyl, Bachelard); some accounts of AI (artificial intelli-
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gence); treatment of lacunae and dilemmas in deontic and normative systems; coping with
paradoxes; and so on. The author’s leaning towards relativism clearly emerges when he
brands what he calls «privileging the position of strong logos» (p. 58) and when he
denounces any absolute truth whether for us or in itself. But of course the reader can profit
from studying the book even if he keeps clear of such truth-relativism. Again some com-
parisons with other paraconsistent approaches would have been welcome.
